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Abstract: LoRaWAN is a long range, low energy and low throughput network technology
used to provide connectivity to all kind of devices. Encryption ensure the confidentiality of the
conveyed data but do not protects metadata, including the DevAddress which is the device identifier
allocated by the LoRa network. Because of the long range of the radio signals and the open nature
of the wireless medium, this metadata can be easily collected and can leak potentially sensitive
information about a system communicating through LoRa [11].
In addition to the DevAddress, a device is also identified by a DevEUI, a globally unique and
permanent identifier. As opposed to the DevAddress, the DevEUI is a static identifier and it can
generally be linked to the device manufacturer or the device type. The DevEUI is thus a source
of additional information that could be combined with the traffic metadata to gain additional
knowledge on a device. However, on the wireless link the DevEUI is only exposed during the join
procedure and is never directly associated with other identifiers, and in particular not with the
DevAddress.
In this document, we focus on this problem and present a method to link a DevEUI to a DevAddress
and thus to the associated metadata. Our method relies on the time correlation between messages
exchanged during the device activation and registration on the LoRa network. The proposed
method is tested on two sets of LoRa traces: a real-world dataset and a synthetic one. The
corresponding simulation results shows that a significant fraction of the DevEUI can be matched
to a DevAddress. Finally we discuss a number of measures that could be adopted to reduce the
efficiency of the presented address linking attack.
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Ré-identification d’adresses dans les réseaux LoRaWAN
Résumé : LoRaWAN est une technologie réseau à longue portée, faible débit et basse
consommation d’énergie utilisée pour fournir une connectivité à toutes sortes d’appareils. Le
chiffrement assure la confidentialité des données mais ne protège pas les métadonnées, en par-
ticulier la DevAddress qui est l’identifiant de l’appareil alloué par le réseau LoRa. A cause de
la longue portée des signaux radio et de la nature ouverte du medium sans-fil, ces métadonnées
peuvent être aisément collectées et peuvent exposer des informations potentiellement sensibles à
propos d’un système [11].
En plus de la DevAddress, un appareil est aussi identifié par un DevEUI, un identifiant unique.
Contrairement au DevAddress, le DevEUI est statique et il peut être rattaché à un constructeur
ou au type de l’appareil. Le DevEUI est donc une source d’information qui pourrait être combiné
avec d’autres métadonnées. Cependant, sur le canal radio, le DevEUI est seulement exposé
durant la procédure d’association et n’est jamais directement associé à d’autres identifiant, et en
particulier jamais avec le DevAddress.
Dans ce document, nous traitons ce problème et présentons une méthode permettant de lier
un DevEUI à un DevAddress, et ainsi aux métadonnées associées. Notre méthode repose sur une
corrélation temporelle entre les messages échangés durant la phase d’activation et d’association
au réseau LoRa. Cette méthode est testée sur un jeu de traces réel et un jeu de traces synthétique.
Les résultats de simulation obtenus montrent qu’une fraction significative des DevEUI peuvent
être associé à un DevAddress. Nous terminons en proposant des mesures qui pourraient être
adoptées pour empêcher cette attaque.
Mots-clés : adresse, identifiant, vie privée, ré-identification, LoRaWAN
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1 Introduction
As part as the Internet of Things (IoT) a number of low resources devices are currently deployed.
To cope with the constraints of those devices, new telecommunication technologies called LPWAN
(Low Powered andWide Area Network) have emerged. One of the prominent LPWAN technology
is the LoRaWAN protocol [9] whose wireless link is called LoRa. LoRaWAN has been largely
adopted worldwide and there are millions of device across 133 networks in 143 countries [1]
currently using this technology.
In LoRaWAN, messages are first transmitted over a wireless link before being forwarded over
the Internet to the destination server. When transiting over this wireless link, messages can easily
be recorded by any eavesdropper in range. To cope with associated security issues, LoRaWAN
includes several mechanisms that enforce, among others, the confidentiality of the payload [9,
Section 4.3.3].
Encryption protects the confidentiality of the payload but the remainder of the packet is
left in clear, potentially exposing metadata. Another source of metadata is the temporality of
transmission which could reveal the type of the device (e.g. a temperature sensor reporting at
the same time every day). The traffic metadata can also reveal information about the device
status and its surrounding (e.g. a presence detector will emit only if a presence is detected) [11].
Another key element of metadata exposed in LoRaWAN wireless traffic are the identifiers: the
device address (DevAddress) that serves to identify the device with regard to the base station
and the device EUI (DevEUI) which identifies the device on the LoRaWAN network. Included
in every data packet the DevAddress can help an eavesdropper to associate wireless activity to
entities allowing him to derive information by leveraging the temporal feature of the traffic [11].
On the other hand, the DevEUI is a globally unique identifier that can be leveraged to infer other
information on the device (manufacturer, type, or the associated application and sensor) that is
only exposed during the association process.
By linking a DevAddress with a DevEUI, an adversary could combine the information brought
by each element and thus increase its knowledge on the device, its activities and the associated
applications. In LoRaWAN, the link between a DevEUI and a DevAddress address is only avail-
able to owner of the device. An eavesdropper cannot directly link a DevEUI to a DevAddress as
there is no message in which both DevAddress and DevEUI are included in clear-text.
In this work, we present a technique for identifying the DevAddress associated to a DevEUI.
Our approach is based on temporality of join request emitted by a device and the first message
emitted by this device following the join request. We present a temporal linking method and
evaluate it on a real-world dataset comprising 51 000 join requests, as well as on a synthetic
dataset. Those first results indicates that a re-identification rate of up to 90% could be achieved.
Finally we present several counter-measures that could be used to protect devices against this
attack.
2 LoRaWAN
LoRaWAN is a media access control (MAC) protocol based on LoRa, a wireless technology for
long-range and low-energy transmission. LoRa frames are limited in size (payload of maximum
222 bytes) and the number of frame sent by a device is constrained by a minimum delay between
two consecutive frames1 and a maximum number of frame per unit of time2. Together, minimum
delay and maximum number of frames define the duty cycle. Local regulations [2] defines the
1At least time to send the frame + 2 *time window for receiving frame
2For instance The Things Network fair policies are of 30s of uplink messages per day per node.
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maximum duty-cycle a device must respect relative to a regional ISM band (a duty cycle of 1%
is enforced in France). LoRa signals are modulated using chirps with various spreading factors
and are transmitted over 16 channels (some regions allow more than 16 channels) located in the
433.05-434.79 MHz or 863-870 MHz bands.
2.1 Architecture
A LoRaWAN network is composed of end-devices, gateways, network servers and finally applica-
tion servers, in a star-of-star topology. End-devices and gateways communicate using the LoRa
radio link, while communications between gateways and servers use standard IP connectivity.
Each gateway can forward messages to any known network server, leading to a community of
LoRaWAN gateways that helps increasing the global coverage. It is possible to add devices
around existing gateways with no interaction with the gateways owner, only the network and the
application have to be registered to a network participating to the LoRa-alliance, the non-profit
organization promoting LoRaWAN standard3.
Figure 1: Architecture of a LoRaWAN network.
Messages sent by an end-device are called uplink messages, while messages sent by the
gateway to end-devices are called downlink messages. After their activation, LoRaWAN devices
are asynchronous as they send their uplink messages whenever they need to. To correctly
receive downlink messages from a gateway, a device has to be in receiver mode. Gateways can
only transmit downlink messages when they know the device is in receiver mode.
2.2 End-device
LoRaWAN describes [9] three classes of device (A, B and C) defining their communication fea-
tures.
A class A device, supports the minimal features. It can send uplink messages whenever it
needs to. Furthermore, after each uplink message transmission, it stays in receive mode during
3https://lora-alliance.org/
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two downlink receive windows, waiting for potential downlink messages. Class A devices thus
maintain a low energy consumption, by only activating their radio when they are required and
at their initiative.
Class B, extends class A by allowing devices to periodically emit an uplink message to offer
an opportunity for a downlink message.
Class C devices, further extends those features by allowing for downlink message reception
whenever the device is not sending an uplink message.
2.3 Frame format
A LoRaWAN frame contains an header and a payload. The header is at least 13 bytes long;
it contains the device’s DevAddress and information about frame options. As the information
contained in the header (in particular the DevAddress) needs to be available to any receiver,
the header is not encrypted. The payload contains the transmitted data. It is encrypted using
AES-CTR 128. The maximum payload size depends on the spreading factor, from 51 bytes
with SF=12 to 222 bytes with SF=7. A MIC (Message Integrity Code) field is added after
the payload; it is computed over the header and the payload using AES-CMAC 128 with the
networkSessionKey as a key. This MIC is used by the network to validate the integrity of a
frame.
Figure 2: Detail of a LoRaWAN uplink message.
2.4 Addressing
A device has a globally unique EUI64 identifier (DevEUI) from its constructor, used as a MAC
address. The first 3 bytes contain the OUI (Organizationally Unique Identifier) of the constructor
registered from IEEE. This DevEUI should be unique during the device’s life and stored on non-
volatile memory.
LoRaWAN added a second temporary identifier, in order to use a same device over different
network. This device address (DevAddress) is a 32 bits identifier generated by the Network
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server during the join procedure. The seven first bits of the DevAddress are called the NwkID
4 and corresponds to the 7 first bits of the network identifier (NetID), while the 25 last bits are
randomly chosen. The NetID allows device to roam across different network and allow routing
of messages to the correct network. NetID are attributed by the Lora-Alliance to each network
provider. A DevAddress can be used by multiple device at the same time, even devices from the
same application, thus it may not be used as a globally unique identifier5. To uniquely identify a
a device, the network uses the tuple {DevAddress, networkSessionKey}. Network servers know
for each device the DevEUI, the current DevAddress and the networkSessionKey. They map a
message to the right DevEUI and appEUI using this information.
2.5 Personalization and Activation
A device has to be personalized and activated to be able to send uplink messages. The person-
alization part requires to register the device to the network server. This registration consists in
configuring the DevEUI, the appEUI (Application EUI) and the appKey (Application key) on the
two parties [9, Section 6.2]. The activation part requires one of the two process (OTAA or ABP)
to generate the DevAddress and the two keys : nwkSKey (networkSessionKey) and appSKey (ap-
plicationSessionKey). This information is only known by the end-device, the network server and
the application server. Depending on the process for the activation step, sharing this information
is done by a LoRaWAN canal (OTAA) or by a third party channel (ABP).
Over-The-Air-Activation - OTAA With Over-The-Air-Activation, the steps of the acti-
vation process, known as "join procedure" are performed directly over the LoRa wireless link
through an exchange of messages between the device and the network. The OTAA assumes that
the network server already knows the DevEUI, the appEUI and the appKey that will be used by
the device. Only the appEUI is shared through multiples devices, all the others parameters are
specific to a device. Through the OTAA the network will allocated a DevAddress to the device
and record the association with the DevEUI.
The join procedure is in two steps. First, the device send to the network a join request
including its DevEUI, the appEUI and a random nonce called devNonce. Then the network
replies with a join accept message containing the DevAddress allocated by the network and
a random nonce called the appNonce. This downlink payload is encrypted using the appKey,
only the device can decrypt it. Finally, the devNonce and appNonce are used to compute the
networkSessionKey, a secret key shared by the device and the network used to encrypt the
payload and to verify its integrity through a MIC.
The DevEUI is only present in the join request while the join accept only contain the
DevAddress, encrypted. The gateway send the downlink join accept to all listening devices, but
only the right device can decrypt it and get the DevAddress.
If the OTAA fails, the end-device enter a waiting state and will retry after a period of time.
An OTAA without need to enter the waiting state will last few seconds. [18]
After the OTAA step, the DevEUI is never included in any message, and only the DevAddress
is exposed as part of the header of all uplink messages.
OTAA is the recommended process for LoRaWAN activation for maintainability and security
[8].
Activation-By-Personalization- ABP With Activation-By-Personalization (ABP), the DevAddress
and the associated NetworkSessionKey are preconfigured on the device and the network before-
4NwkID is renamed AddrPrefix in LoRaWAN 1.1
5https://www.thethingsnetwork.org/docs/lorawan/addressing.html
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hand. A device configured with ABP does not need to go through the join procedure and can
start operating (sending and receiving messages) as soon as it is powered on.
While ABP is quicker to activate, this activation can only be done once in a lifetime of a
device. A physical access to the device is required before every new activation to update its
default parameters.
2.6 Post activation
Once activated a device can start communicating through the network, by either sending uplink
messages or receiving downlink messages. In a typical scenario, a device will undergo the
activation procedure and will then transmit uplink messages, and potentially receive downlink
messages, over a period of time that can range from weeks to months[14].
2.7 Exposed information
Messages exchanged over the LoRa radio link can be easily collected by an attacker and can
expose some information. All uplink and downlink messages contain a payload, encrypted with
a state of the art algorithm, thus ensuring the confidentiality of the corresponding data.
Other elements, especially the headers, are not encrypted and can reveal information on the
device and its application. The DevEUI contains some information about the constructor of the
device, while the DevAddress contains information about the nwkID.
3 Dataset & first Observations
3.1 Dataset
For this study, we use a dataset of join requests and uplink messages captured by multiple
gateways dispatched around the La Doua university campus, at Villeurbanne in France. The
dataset contains 51 301 join requests and 88 260 uplink messages sent through gateways.
Data is collected from December, 1st 2019 to May, 31st 2020. From February 25th to March 7th,
the gateway was offline and there is thus a visible gap in the dataset.
Each join request is identified by its DevEUI, while each uplink message it identified by
its DevAddress. An uplink message is either unconfirmed data up or confirmed data up. Their
difference lies in the response from the network server. This does not impact the Activation
process and the information we use from the data up is identical, thus we regroup the data up
types as one named uplink message. An uplink message contains an id (the DevAddress),
the time of its first appearance, its last appearance and the number of appearance. We have
little information regarding the devices deployed in the area around our gateways. As such we
do not know the number of devices or the associated applications.
3.2 Observations
Join requests: During the period covered by our dataset, 751 339 join requests were sent.
This join requests are aggregated based on their DevEUI to identify unique devices. We obtain
51 301 DevEUI out of this 751 339 join requests. Our dataset is composed of the last join
request for each DevEUI. Timestamp of a join request mark the last time its DevEUI has been
seen by the gateway. We identify a device based on its unique DevEUI and the time it activated
as the timestamp of the last join request of the DevEUI.
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Figure 3: Distribution of join requests each day, between December 1st,2019 and May 31st, 2020
On the figure 3, the distribution shows at least 200 join requests per day. The blank period
represents a 12-days failure, no data was recorded during this event. During January (between
the 31st and the 62nd days of the dataset), each day contains 2 time more join requests at
least and a peak is visible at January 12th.
join requests are sent all day long with a small extra during daytime than during night
time. Furthermore, every hour, there is a concentration of join requests between the 20th
min and the 40th min. On the figure 4, all join requests from the 180-day long period are
condensed on the same day. The two peaks of 10min (20-30 and 30-40) are visible each hour.
As this is observed each hour, this suggests that an automated process is responsible for this
peculiar behavior.
DevEUI Among the 51 301 unique DevEUI, 94%sent only one join request. Either the
devices active during their first try and do not need to re-activate after, or the activation process
is not successful but the devices do not try again. The Things Network, a community-oriented
LoRaWAN network, recommends to minimize the number of activation [13] to reduce the energy
consumption. This expected behavior could explain the very high proportion of DevEUI activated
only once.
A device’s DevEUI should be extended from the OUI of the device’s constructor or CID
(Company ID) based on IEEE Standards Association [4]. The second to last bit from the first
octet of a DevEUI distinguishes an EUI extended from an OUI or from a CID. As OUI are
registered by the IEEE Registration Authority and public, we can link a LoRaWAN device to a
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Figure 4: Overall distribution of join request over 24 hours, by bin of 10 mins.
constructor thanks to the OUI. We observe only 15% of DevEUI are extended from a OUI. Another
part of 33% contains DevEUI extended from CID (company ID). The rest (52%) is composed by
DevEUI with unknown OUI. Either the OUI is not officially registered, or the DevEUI is randomly
generated.
We focus on DevEUI extended from official OUI and unregistered OUI as they contain a group
identity. It is expected to find multiple devices from the same manufacturer around the same
gateway.
On the figure 6 we represent the percentage of DevEUI extended from OUI. There are organi-
zations which appear clearly through their OUI such as : HOMERIDER SYSTEMS (90-DF-FB)
with 5,78% which represent 2965 DevEUI, and IP. Access Limited (00-02-95) with 3.98% which
represent 2043 DevEUI.
In total we detected 521 different OUI (representing 15% of DevEUI) and an "OUI_not_registered"
group for all the unknown OUI (51% of the DevEUI). 323 out of 521 OUI are only represented
by one DevEUI. Expanding this set to OUI generating less than 5 DevEUI (which mean less than
5 unique devices manufactured), we obtain 443 OUI (84%). DevEUI of this last set are likely
randomly generated and have no real connection with the original OUI’s organization.
HOMERIDER SYSTEMS’s OUI (90-DF-FB) appears in more than 5% of all the join requests
and seems be an active LoRaWAN device manufacturer. HOMERIDER SYSTEMS corresponds
to a former french company now merged in Birdz, an IoT company specialized in water con-
sumption monitoring and probably has devices working around our gateway. Most of the DevEUI
extended from the HOMERIDER SYSTEMS’s OUI are seen only once, possibly meaning the
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0.85 0.59 0.34 0.32 0.27 0.15 1.29
Figure 6: List of most represented OUI
OTAA succeeded on the first try.
ARDUINO AG’s OUI extended DevEUI are only 79. Inside this small group, 2 DevEUI sent
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more than 1000 join requests, which is not the expected behavior (probably an experiment).
On the other side, 53 DevEUI sent only one join request, these are likely real ARDUINO
devices present around our gateway.
UpLink messages During the period covered by our dataset, 2 847 112 uplink messages
were sent with an average of 32 per DevAddress. For each DevAddress we kept the time of
appearance as the time of the first uplink message using this DevAddress. The resulting dataset












































Figure 7: Number of uplink containing new DevAddress per day
There is an average of 490 uplink messages per day, with extreme short peak of 1 to 2
days. Peaks can be linked to real event such as activation of many device from a new network,
or re activation after an outage of the neighbouring gateway and the loss of connection with the
network.
DevAddress Among 88 260 unique DevAddress, 87% send only one uplink message and
96% send 10 or less uplink messages. Using the database from The Thing Network website 6,
we manage to assign a Network to every DevAddress. Among the public networks we detect 88
registered networks.
We found that at least 55% of all DevAddress have an non-identifiable nwkID that is ei-
ther Network_not_registered (41.8%), unassigned (10.5%) or Private/experimental nodes
6https://www.thethingsnetwork.org/docs/lorawan/prefix-assignments.html
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2.3 1.9 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6
Figure 8: List of most represented NwkId and the percentage of number of uplink messages for
each network
7 (4.9%). NwkID are the 7 first bits of a DevAddress, which lead to identifiable ranges of
DevAddress. The Network_not_registered group refer to DevAddress which do not fall into
currently registered ranges. This DevAddress could come from private or experimental project
whit no official network but a dedicated range of addresses. Another possibility come from ran-
domly generated DevAddress. Within the total range of nwkID, only 44% are associated to
registered networks. Any random DevAddress has a fifty-fifty chance (exactly 56%) to contain
an unregistered nwkID. unassigned represent ranges of DevAddress already created but not
assigned to a network. We can merge them with the Network_not_registered ranges to create
a set off ranges identifying an Unknown network.
Our gateway is based in France, thus it is expected to detect more French networks such
as Bouygues Telecom or La Poste among the most represented networks (8. Bouygues Telecom
is a French Internet service providers. Its range represent 0.78% of the possible DevAddress
values while we detect 14% of the DevAddress (12 453 DevAddress out of 88 260) which belong
to it. It seems there are active devices near our gateways, connected to the Bouygues Telecom
LoRaWAN network. Other Internet service providers are also present but with a far smaller
number of DevAddress, such as Orange (2010 DevAddress, 2.3% of all the DevAddress) or
SwissCom (955 DevAddress, 1.59% of all the DevAddress).
Selecting the 4 most represented network and the overall, we draw their activation of new
DevAddress through the period. Unknown regroup the previous Network_not_registered and
7range 00000000 : 03FFFFFF
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Figure 9: Number of new DevAddress per day by network
The Bouygues Telecom network show a clear peak during the 12th and 13th January, in parallel
of the total peak during this period. During this two days the number of new DevAddress is
increased by a factor 5. This peak contain 95% of used once DevAddress, similar to an uplink
message test. For reference, the median value of the number of uplink message for a Bouygues
Telecom’s DevAddress is 92, which imply a message sent every 2 days in average.
The Things Network is used by an average of 9 new DevAddress every day, 6 days show
peaks far higher (between 10 to 20 times) than an average day. The highest peak aim to 104
new DevAddress the January, 6th with all of this DevAddress sending only one uplink message.
The 13th of December, among the 99 new DevAddress, only 6 will be really used (between 500
and 900 uplink messages) while the 93 other will only be seen once.
Compared to Bouygues Telecom and its 12 453 DevAddress, SwissCom has less than ten
times less DevAddress (955), but most importantly the median number of uplink message for
a SwissCom’s DevAddress is only 1.6, which imply at least half of its devices send only one
uplink message. The SwissCom network does not seems to have devices sending daily uplink
messages as to what is expected from LoRaWAN devices. The SwissCom network may be
operational but it is not actively used.
Global observations We draw the curves representing the number of new DevEUI and DevAddress
per day on the same graph to compare their evolution. As every join request should lead to the
activation of the device, which then would send an uplink message, we expect to have at least
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Figure 10: Comparaison of number of new DevAddress and new devEUI per day
There is no clear correlation between the curves from the figure 10. The difference of 40%
between new DevAddress and new DevEUI imply that only 60% of the new DevAddress are
generated during an OTAA. New DevAddress can also be generated via Activation By Person-
alization while devices can display their DevEUI during the OTAA but neither send any uplink
message using their newly attributed DevAddress afterward.
Locals matching patterns exist, such as the January 12th to 13th peak. We identify the
Bouygues Telecom event during this two days, when the peak of new DevAddress is clearly
visible on the DevEUI curve. All those new DevAddress seems to have been generated during the
OTAA. The matching peak between the two curves during the same day imply a delay between
the OTAA and the first uplink message from the new DevAddress inferior to a day. On this
opposite, the March 31st, more new DevEUI were detected than new DevAddress. There is no
delayed peak from the DevAddress curve, which imply most of the new devices were not following
the normal use case : either the Activation process failed, or the device received a DevAddress
in a join-accept message but neither sent an uplink message with its DevAddress.
4 Re-identifying Dev addresses
In LoRaWAN, a device is identified by two identifiers, the DevAddress and the DevEUI. The
association between those two identifiers is only available to the application and the network.
Inria
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An external observer monitoring the radio link will not be able to directly link a DevAddress to
a DevEUI since no message contains both elements in clear.
In this section we present a method to re-identify LoRaWAN addresses, i.e. find the DevAddress
associated to a DevEUI. This attack is based on the timing of messages transmitted during and
shortly after the activation process. This attack leverages the fact that new DevAddress are allo-
cated for each activation. Therefore, a never seen before DevAddress appearing on the network
can be correlated to a recent activation in which a DevEUI has been exposed.
4.1 Hypothesis and attacker model
We make the assumption that a DevAddress is unique to a device during our experiment. We
assume that a device does not loses its connection and keeps the same DevAddress. If a device
loses the connection with the network it will try again the OTAA and will be given a new
DevAddress.
As described in Section 2.6 a devices needs to be activated before transferring data. The
LoRaWAN specification recommends the OTAA process for the activation part [8]. We expect
each device to send a join request, as part of their OTAA, followed by multiples uplink
message.
Attacker model The goal of the attacker is to associate a DevAddress to each DevEUI active
on the network. We assume that the attacker is able to monitor LoRaWAN traffic on the LoRa
radio link, either by monitoring the wireless signals with a dedicated receiver or by having control
of a gateway. This can be achieved by controlling or simply setting up a LoRaWAN gateway
that cost around 300e8 or by compiling free code on many small computer costing 100e, such
as "SX1308 Raspberry Pi Zero LoRa Gateway Board"9. Furthermore, we assume that the
attacker is passive, i.e. it only collects messages and never injects messages nor disrupts the
communications.
As a result, the attacker has access to header and metadata of frames, and payload of cleartext
frames, but cannot decrypt the payload of encrypted frames.
4.2 Re-identification process
In this section we present a method to reidentify DevEUI. This method is based on the matching of
a join request, that includes a DevEUI, with an uplink message, that includes a DevAddress.
Following the assumption that a device activate in order to send data, and so will send an uplink
message shortly after its activation, our approach relies on the timing of those messages to find
the correct match.
Our approach works as follows: for each DevEUI found in a join request we find the first new
DevAddress appearing after the join request; the corresponding DevAddress is then associated
to the DevEUI.
We keep our join request list ordered by time and we start to match the oldest join
request first. To reduce the possibility of incorrect matches, we limit the distance between
the two messages to be lower than a threshold maxTimeOffset. This means that, for a join
request sent a time t, only the uplink message that are observed before t+maxTimeOffset will
be considered for matching.
A DevAddress is removed of the list of candidates once it has been matched with a DevEUI.
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This approach is implemented by the algorithm 1. It takes as input a list of join request
(objects containing {DevEUI, datetime}) and a list of uplink message (objects containing {DevAddress,
datetime}, both ordered by time. Following an iterative approach the algorithm goes through
all join requests, and for each join request goes through all uplink messages and select
the first one appearing after the join request and before maxTimeOffset; the corresponding
DevAddress is then associated to the join request’s DevEUI in the mapM . The corresponding
uplink message is then removed from the uplink message list.
Algorithm 1 Re-identification Algorithm
Input : joinRequestList : list of joinRequest, and
upLinkList : list of upLink ordered by date
Output: M[devEUI]=devAddress : for each devEUI, map the corresponding devAd-
dress
for all joinRequest in joinRequestList do
M [joinRequest.devEUI]← ∅
for all upLink in upLinkList do
if (upLink.time > joinRequest.time) AND (upLink.time < joinRequest.time +
maxTimeOffset) then






We evaluate our algorithm on two datasets. The first dataset is the one presented in Section 3.1
and corresponds to real world capture of LoRaWAN traffic. However, for this dataset, we do not
have access to the real association between DevAddress and DevEUI; we thus lack the groundtruth
to fully evaluate the performances of our approach. Therefore, we rely on a synthetic dataset,
which contains a similar number of join request and uplink messages as the real dataset.
The synthetic dataset is composed of 50 000 join requests distributed uniformly over a
period of 6 month. Each join request is associated to a unique DevEUI. For each join request,
we generate an uplink message with a delay following the Poisson distribution with λ = 160,
the average delay between a join request and the next uplink message observed in the real
dataset.
For each of our dataset, we execute our algorithm. The threshold maxTimeOffset follow this
logarithmic scales, in seconds : [2, 5, 11, 26, 61, 138, 316, 719, 1637, 3727, 8483, 19306, 86400,
172800 ].
Applying our method to the real-world dataset provide an indication of the number of DevEUI
that can be reidentified and allows us to identify possibles links between networks (from the
DevAddress) and devices manufacturers (from the DevEUI).
Results obtained with the synthetic dataset provides an estimation of the performances of
the proposed approach. In particular, it allows to compute the number of true/false posi-
tives/negatives and the corresponding metrics. After the execution of our algorithm for each
value of maxTimeOffset, we define the following quantities:
• True positive (TP): the number of DevEUI matched to their corresponding DevAddress
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• False positive (FP): the number of DevEUI matched to a wrong DevAddress
• False Negative (FN): the number of DevEUI not to DevAddress but which should have
been
from which are derived the following metrics:
• Positive Predicted Value (PPV): TPTP+FP
• False Discovery Rate (FDR): FPTP+FP
• True Positive Rate (TPR): TPTP+FN
5.1 Results
















Figure 11: Variation of different metrics as a function of the maxTimeOffset applied the generated
dataset.
The matching algorithm was applied to the synthetic dataset, and using its ground-truth
we computer the corresponding performances. The figure 11 show the variation of the Positive
Predicted Value (PPV) and the False Discovery Rate (FDR) as a function of maxTimeOffset.
Overall the performances increases as the maxTimeOffset increases; and in particular in the
region around maxTimeOffset = λ = 160, where the PPV grows up from 0 to more than 0.5,
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and DFR goes down from 1 to less than 0.5. This result is expected given the way this dataset
was generated: the distance between the join request and the uplink message is centered
around λ = 160 seconds.
After the value maxTimeOffset = 200, 94% of the DevEUI are matched, with 95% of this

















Figure 12: Variation of TPR as a function of the maxTimeOffset applied the generated dataset.
5.1.2 Application to the real-world dataset
As the real-world dataset does not include ground-truth, it was not possible to directly evaluate
the efficiency of the algorithm. The algorithm was applied to this dataset and a number of re-
identification were obtained. Figure 13 presents the fraction of re-identified DevEUI as as function
of maxTimeOffset in the real-world dataset. The fraction of DevEUI increases as maxTimeOffset
increases, but without reaching 100%. For a maxTimeOffset of 172 800 seconds (= 2 days), there
are still 2% of DevEUI that have not been matched. Apart from an error of our re-identification,
this could be explained by a failure during the activation or by the lack of uplink messages
after the join request. With a value of maxTimeOffset=316, 60% of the DevEUI are matched
with a DevAddress.
Observation on device deployment Leveraging the results of real-world dataset we are able
to make some observation such as the correlation between the nwkID and the OUI and peak of
activation in a network.
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Figure 13: Fraction of re-identified devEUI as a function of the maxTimeOffset applied on the
realworld dataset and the synthetic dataset.
For each matched pair of DevEUI/ DevAddress, the DevAddress provides the nwkID while
the DevEUI provides the OUI. Thus, the re-identification allows us to analyze the correlation
between nwkID and OUI.
Figure 14 show the distribution of OUI found in the The Things Network network. A majority
(80%) of DevEUI have a non-registered OUI, and only a small fraction of DevEUI are associated
to registered OUI corresponding to companies such as Homerider (6.4%) and Arduino AG (3.3
%).
The reidentification result allowed us to spot a peculiar activity on the Bouygues Telecom
network between January 11th and 12th. During this period, a peak of device activation was
observed on the Bouygues Telecom network as seen on Figure 15. The corresponding DevEUI
were associated to "Elektronik System i Umeå AB" and the "OUI_not_registered" group. This
peak is momentary and the new DevAddress are seen only once. This suggest new devices were
tested but not deployed.
We observe DevEUI extended from the "Elektronik System i Umeå AB" OUI do not represent
an important part of the Bouygues Telecom network. They appear mainly during the January
peak and May. This event can be interpreted as an activation on the Bouygues Telecom network
of devices associated to Elektronik System i Umeå AB. It is difficult to estimate the number of
real devices activated but at least one hundred DevEUI extended from Elektronik System i Umeå
AB were seen.
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Figure 14: Number of devEUI by company matched to DevAddress associated to The Things
Network.
6 Counter-measures
This section presents several counter-measures that can be used to reduce the efficiency of the
address reidentification attack presented above.
Delaying the first uplink message As the attack relies on timing, introducing some pertur-
bation in this timing can increase the difficulty of the attack. More specifically, a random delay
can be introduced between the join request and the first uplink message.
Introduction of delay will have a minimal impact on the application, as it will only impact
the device just after activation by introducing a delay in its activation. The larger the delay, the
more difficult it will be to reidentify addresses.
Shared DevAddress Another solution to mitigate observation that can be done on a device
is to share a same DevAddress between multiple devices, thus creating an anonymity set [10].
As multiple devices are using the same DevAddress, an attacker would not be able to associate
traffic to a specific device but only to a group of device.
Having multiple devices behind the same DevAddress appear to be compatible with the
specifications. First, the DevAddress is not supposed to be uniquely allocated to a device; then
in the network, the identification of a device does not only rely on the DevAddress, but also on
the NwkSessionKey. Therefore, as long as each device in the set uses a different NwkSessionKey,
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Figure 15: Number of devEUI by company matched to DevAddress associated to by Bouygues
Telecom network.
the network should be able to associate each message to the correct device.
DevAddress rotation Changing the DevAddress of a device without going through a join
request can hamper the the re-identification attack.
A first way to implement this address change would be to let the device and the network
server select a new address through the existing secured channel. The address rotation could be
initiated by the device or by the server. To this aim, it will be necessary to define new message
types and a new procedure to implement this address rotation functionality.
A second option for DevAddress rotation is to use the concept of resolvable addresses as used
in Bluetooth[16, Vol 6, Part B, Section 1.3.2.2]. Based on a secret key shared by the server and
the device, the device can generate addresses that would appear random to an external observer
but not to the server that will be able to recognize them by resolving them using the shared key.
With each of those solutions, the device will be able to use DevAddress that are unlinkable
with the DevEUI based on the join procedure.
7 Related work
Since its release, LoRaWAN has been the subject of a number of security studies. A general
analysis of security features of LoRaWAN is presented in [7]. In there paper [3], Aras et al.
present a number of attack scenarios including jamming, replay and wormhole attacks, as well
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Figure 16: Number of devEUI from Elektronik System i Umeå AB matched to DevAddress
generated by Bouygues Telecom by month.
as key compromise via physical access. In [17], Tomasin et al. identified a poor management of
random number in the join procedure, which could lead to denial of service triggered by replay
attacks.
As opposed to security, privacy aspects of LoRaWAN has received little attention. Features
of wireless traffic can be leveraged to infer the activities of devices operating on a network. This
problem is addressed by Leu et al. [11] in the more general context of LPWAN; they introduce
a solution to obfuscate temporal patterns by introducing random delays and injecting dummy
traffic.
Identification of wireless device can be done at the physical layer by leveraging features of the
raw wireless signal. Physical fingerprinting as been applied to LoRa by Robyns et al. [15]; they
demonstrated how a device can be singled-out using machine learning applied to signal collected
through software-defined radio.
Timing information and frame content has already been exploited to link device identifiers.
Matte et. al showed [12] that timing of 802.11 frames could be leveraged to link the consecutive
random addresses used by a device. Pseudonyms belonging to the same device have been linked
based on the body of the frame, from the physical [6] layer to the application layer [19, 5].
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8 Conclusion
As demonstrated in this paper, the DevEUI and the DevAddress of a LoRa device can be linked.
This attack relies on the join procedure of LoRa protocol and leverage the fact that a join
request is shortly followed by an uplink message. According to our simulation, up to 90% of
devices could have their addresses successfully linked. Note that those numbers have been ob-
tained using a naive model for LoRaWAN traffic. As future work, we plan on using a more refined
model for generating the synthetic dataset. Furthermore, those results need to be confirmed on
a real dataset where the ground truth is readily available.
The information revealed by this attack can be exploited by the attacker to gain additional
knowledge on an application running on LoRaWAN. Depending on the nature of the application,
this information can threaten the privacy of individuals or could expose sensitive information
about a company.
The LoRaWAN specification includes measures to ensure the confidentiality of the data trans-
mitted over the network. However, as of today, privacy threats resulting from side channel leak-
ages are not covered. Some of the countermeasures presented in this paper could be deployed
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